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Federal income tax exemption of interest from state and local bonds
has traditionally been a source of congressional debate.' In recent
years, Congress has been successful in enacting legislation which limits
the type of industrial development bond that can qualify for the exemp-
tion 2 and outlaws the tax exemption of interest from arbitrage bonds. 3
Other proposals by the House of Representatives, attempting to curtail
the status of these bonds, were contained in the Tax Reform Act of
1969 which would have placed a limit on the amount of the exemption
and treated the excess as a tax preference item. 4 In addition, the pro-
posed act provided for an allocation of deductions between tax-exempt
and taxable income and included as tax-exempt income the interest
from the tax-exempt bonds.5 In addition to outlawing arbitrage bonds,6
a proposal was made to establish United States Government subsidies to
states which would voluntarily submit their bonds to income taxation in
the hands of the holders. 7 The act as finally passed with respect to
exempt interest from state or local bonds only included the proposal to
outlaw arbitrage transactions. 8
1. See Lent, The Origin and Survival of Tax-Exempt Securities, 12 NAT'L
TAX J. 301 (1959).
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 103(c).
3. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 103(d).
4. See H.R. 13270 proposed § 301 of the act as passed by the House of Rep-
resentatives on July 30, 1969.
5. See H.R. 13270 proposed § 302 of the act as passed by the House of Rep-
resentatives on July 30, 1969.
6. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 103(d).
7. See H.R. 13270 proposed H8 601 and 602 as passed by the House of Rep-
resentatives on July 30, 1969.
8. INT. Rv. CODE of 1954, § 103(d).
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Congressional debate and failure to eliminate the tax-exempt char-
acter of state and local bonds can stem from the doctrine of intergovern-
mental immunity9 and/or state and local pressure on Congress to have
its borrowing power enjoy a lower cost in the market place because
of the tax-exempt feature. 10  Although presently subject to debate as
to the applicability of the doctrine to tax-exempt bonds, 1 the Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan and Trust12 case, when specifically confronted with the
question of whether an income tax on the interest of the holder was
constitutional, held that such was a tax on the power to borrow money
and consequently a burden on the state in performing an essential
sovereign function. The market advantages to the state arise from the
attraction of the tax-exempt feature to private individuals and corpora-
tions. For example, a tax bracket of 50% means that your after tax
income effective yield of an 8% private bond is 4%. Thus, an investor
in the 50% bracket would find it more profitable to invest in a 5% state
and local bond than in an 8 % private bond.
Despite the problems and debate posed by the constitutional concept
of intergovernmental immunity and pressure from state and local gov-
ernment, state and local bonds are essentially financial devices to raise
funds for state and local needs. From this perspective it becomes easy
to understand the state's reluctance to shed the benefit of the exemption.
State and local governments are confronted with increased expenditures
while their sources of revenue have become inferior to the federal gov-
ernment's comprehensive income tax.13  Until relatively recent times
little economic attention was afforded to the problems of "fiscal feder-
alism (the fiscal relation between hierarchically ordered units) or multi-
unit finance (the fiscal relation between coordinate units)."'1 4  How-
ever, when one views the fiscal structure of this country, the decentralized
nature (state and local expenditures) of civilian fiscal affairs cannot be
9. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Pollock v. Farm-
ers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
10. See Lent, supra note 1, at 315; Comment, The Taxability of State and Local
Bond Interest by the Federal Government, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 703, at 709 (effects
of the exemption), 716 (state and local opposition creating political pressure)
(1969).
11. See Comment, Intergovernmental Tax Immunities: An Analysis and Sug-
gested Approach to the Doctrine and its Application to State and Municipal Bond
Interest, 15 VILL. L. REV. 414 (1970).
12. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., supra note 9.
13. See R. WAGNER, THE FISCAL ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 21-22
(1971).
14. ESSAYS IN FISCAL FEDERALISM 1-2 (R. Musgrave ed. 1965).
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ignored. 15 For this reason, federalism in a fiscal sense will have to
adopt forms and functions of finance that will confront the problem of
rising expenses at the state and local level.' 6
In this fiscal federalist concept state or local bonds must be viewed
as a method of finance and an investment. Three relatively recent laws
have exemplified the use of state and local bonds in a spirit of state-
federal fiscal cooperation.' 7  Briefly, these laws make it possible for
state and local bonds to be issued to the federal government in return
for a loan. The federal government subsequently sells the bonds in the
open market; at this point the statutes provide that the purchasers of
these bonds will have to include the interest from these bonds in their
gross income. The federal government subsidizes the difference be-
tween the tax-exempt and the taxable rate because there is no tax-
exempt status after the federal government sells to a private investor.
In other words, the state, for example, issues to the federal government
the bond at 5% (its normal tax-exempt rate), which is the interest the
state pays. If in order to sell the bond to private investors, a higher
interest rate is required since the interest is taxable, the federal govern-
ment must pay the excess, which in this example would be the interest
rate over 5%.
By this method the federal government avoids losing the tax revenues
from the purchaser on the bond,' 8 and the state or local government
retains its lower interest rate. This is a novel approach to both the
highly debated area of tax-exempt bonds and the area of intergovern-
mental fiscal relations often described as fiscal federalism.' 9 State and
15. Id. at 2.
16. See WAGNER, supra note 13, at 21-24; EsSAYS IN FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra
note 14, at 2. For a short but scholarly discussion of the federalist system vs. a
more centralized system, see MAXWELL, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERN-
MENTS 29-32 (1965).
17. Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Amendments, PUB. L.
No. 91-296, 84 STAT. 336; Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, PUB. L.
No. 91-609, 84 STAT. 1769; Agricultural Credit Fund-Loans-Income Tax-In-
terest, 1970, PUB. L. No. 91-617, 84 STAT. 1855.
18. See D. OTT AND A. MELTZER, FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF STATE AND
LOCAL SECURITIES, REVENUE IMPLICATIONS 62-81 (1963), particularly at 81: "In
summary, removing the exemption feature would almost certainly produce revenue
to the federal treasury in excess of the interest cost increase to state and local gov-
ernment."
19. See ESSAYS IN FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 14, at 1-2, which defines
fiscal federalism and then briefly discusses problems of state and local govern-
ment in relation to the federal government. Also take notice of the term fiscal
federalism used in congressional study papers on intergovernmental fiscal relations:
90th Congress, 1st Session, Revenue Sharing and Its Alternative: What Future for
Fiscal Federalism, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. (1967).
1972]
760 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXI
local bonds have progressed from an initial no taxation of interest in-
come to certain restrictions on the exemption if an industrial develop-
ment bond or arbitrage bond is used by the state or local government,
and most recently, to a form or type of intergovernmental obligation.
With industrial development bonds the proceeds of the issue are used
directly or indirectly by a person who is not a state or local government,20
while with arbitrage bonds the proceeds of the issue are used to invest
in higher yielding securities. 21  Thus, with the industrial development
bond the state or local government was in effect selling their tax-exempt
privilege to private industry. 22  In the arbitrage bond situation, the state
or local government was not exercising a government purpose in issuing
debt, but was merely issuing the bond debt as a conduit to invest in
higher yielding federal obligations. 23  The use of these types of bonds has
detracted from the normal use of a state or local bond which is to finance
public facilities and social projects. This paper will not examine the more
intricate issues behind industrial development2 4 and arbitrage bonds;25
rather it will focus on the fundamental doctrine of intergovernmental im-
munity as developed by case law with emphasis on the federal income
tax-exempt status of state and local bonds as being a form of intergov-
ernmental immunity. Further, this paper will explore the latest use of
state and local bonds as a device of fiscal federalism and indicate that this
use is a form of an intergovernmental obligation.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
Before discussing the case law which enunciates and interprets the
20. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 103(c)(2).
21. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 103(d)(2).
22. Surrey, Tax Trends and Bond Financing, 22 TAX LAWYER 123, 127 (1968).
23. Id. at 124.
24. For articles examining in detail industrial development bonds, see McCollom,
Industrial Development Bonds and Tax Policy: A Trend Toward Vivisection of
Public Finance, 23 TAX LAWYER 383 (1970); Bell & Hinkle, A Guide to Industrial
Revenue Bond Financing, 9 WASHBURN L.J. 372 (1970); Hendricks, Reconsideration
of Industrial Development Bond Income Tax Exemptions, 48 ORE. L. REV. 168
(1969); McDaniel, Federal Income Taxation of Industrial Bonds: The Public Inter-
est, I URBAN LAWYER 157 (1969); Mumford, The Past, Present and Future of
Industrial Development Bonds, 1 URBAN LAWYER 147 (1969); Snodgrass, Amended
Section 103: The Industrial Development Bond Loophole Further Restricted, 30
U. Prrr. L. REV. 180 (1968); Martori & Bliss, Taxation of Municipal Bond Inter-
est-"Interesting Speculation" and One Step Forward, 44 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
191 (1968).
25. For a comprehensive work on arbitrage transactions, see Lewis and Loftis,
The Tax-Exempt Status of Local Government Bonds Used in Arbitrage Transac-
tions, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 574 (1967).
doctrine of intergovernmental immunity, a look at the views of Alex-
ander Hamilton, a great financier and statesman, in a related area is
in order. Remember, there is no specific constitutional provision re-
quiring the federal government to refrain from taxing the states and
likewise no provision which curtails state taxation of the federal govern-
ment. With respect to taxation, the Constitution requires that a federal
direct tax must be apportioned among the states; 28 duties, imports and
excises have to be uniform throughout the states;27 and assessment of
duties on imports or exports is an exclusive delegated power of the
United States.28
Hamilton believed that the federal government ought to have an in-
definite power of taxation.29 He was not unaware of the contrary feelings
of those who contended that an indefinite power of taxation in the federal
government would eventually deprive state and local government of
their power to raise revenues.8 0 This argument was deduced by noting
that the federal government was the supreme law of the land; and since
it has the power to pass all laws "necessary" for its operation, the federal
government could abolish state taxing laws under the guise of interference
with its own revenue raising taxes."' In reply to this, Hamilton relates
that the "supposition of usurpation in the national government" is an argu-
ment against power in the federal government caused by imagination
rather than reason.8 2 The usurpation of national government argument
should be referred to the composition and structure of the government
rather than the nature or extent of its powers. 3 Since the state govern-
ments by their original constitutions are sovereigns, the only security the
people have against them is their manner of formation and the propriety
of those who administer the state government.8 4  This same type of
26. U.S. CONST. art. I § 2 clause 3: "Representatives and direct Taxes shall
be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this
Union, according to their respective Numbers .. "
27. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 clause 1: "The Congress shall have Power to lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."
28. U.S. CONsT. art. I § 10 clause 2: "No state shall, without the Consent of
the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may
be absolutely necessary for executing its Inspection Laws .. .
29. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 30 and 31 (A. Hamilton).
30. THE FEDERALiST No. 31, at 196-197 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
31. Id. at 197.
32. Id. at 197.
33. Id. at 197.
34. See id. at 197-98.
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security applies to the federal government and should be used to dispel
fears of usurpation.A5 In other words, the federal government has powers
similar to the sovereign powers of a state; and the probability of abuse
of these powers should not be accorded special attention in the case of
the federal government. Further, there exists just as great a possibility
that the states will encroach on the federal government's power, since the
states are structurally closer to the people, who ultimately have the
power.36  Thus, as Hamilton said, it is best to remove vague conjectures
about federal usurpation and concentrate on the federal powers as de-
lineated in the Constitution, since:
[e]verything beyond this, must be left to the prudence and firmness of the people;
who as they will hold the scales in their own hands, it is hoped, will always take
care to preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the General and the State
Governments. 37
From the preceding analysis, the power of taxation as promulgated by
Hamilton should be indefinite in the federal government. Hamilton also
conceded that the states should retain an independent and unrestrained
power over taxation within their jurisdictions.38
To sum up the views of Hamilton on taxation, two concepts are of
importance in the analysis of intergovernmental immunity. First, the
ultimate control over state-federal relationships and the usurpation of
power by either rests with the people; second, the federal and state
powers exercise concurrent or equal unlimited jurisdiction over the
objects of taxation except duties on imports and exports which have
been exclusively delegated to the federal government. As mentioned,
the Constitution does not expressly prevent federal taxation of state
objects or state taxation of federal objects (intergovernmental immu-
nity), but case law has developed this concept that qualifies or forbids
35. Id. at 198.
36. Id. at 198; See also Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 at 82
(1872). This case interpreted the fourteenth amendment and made the observa-
tion that at the time the Constitution was framed there was a general fear of the
United States Government interfering with the states. As history turns out, it
appears the powers of the state governments may thwart the operation of the na-
tional government. The Court, however, took an historical and critical analysis
of our federalism and the fourteenth amendment and held that the latter did not
change the general system.
37. THE FEDERALIST No. 31, supra note 30, at 198.
38. See THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 199 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton);
THE FEDERALIST No. 33 at 208 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) where this dual
power of taxation except for duties on imports and exports is referred to as Con-
current Jurisdiction. In FEDERALIST No. 34 (A. Hamilton) it is shown that this
concurrent jurisdiction was the only workable alternative to an entire subordina-
tion of the state taxing power to the federal government taxing power.
COMMENTS
various forms of intergovernmental taxation. The elements and degrees
of the doctrine will become evident as the case law is analyzed; but, at
the outset, it can be observed that concurrent jurisdiction over the taxing
power creates the factual problem, since both governments (federal and
state) have, under their indefinite or unlimited power of taxation, the
initial power to tax each other. However, the balancing of the power
of taxation is not being controlled solely by the people, as Hamilton
suggested, but also by the Court through the use of the implied doctrine
of intergovernmental immunity. McCulloch v. Maryland39 formulated
the doctrine when confronted with a Maryland tax imposed on notes
issued by a bank or branch of a bank which was not created by authority
of the state.40  Since the United States National Bank was not created
or authorized by the state, its notes were taxed by the state. In striking
down the tax, the Court took note of the independent sovereignty of
each government, yet held that the tax was an unconstitutional inter-
ference with a means used by the federal government. 41 A point con-
stantly reiterated 42 by Justice Marshall in McCulloch was that the states
are part of the United States; when the United States taxes the state,
it is acting under authority granted it via the people through their
representatives from that state. However, when the state taxes the
United States, only the people of that state have conferred the authority
to tax, yet the tax affects the people of all the states. This distinction
hints at a different standard applicable to state taxation of the federal
government and concurs with Hamilton's view that the people themselves
will control the balance of power in a republic. Since there is an absence
of representation when the state taxes the federal government, the tax
becomes a dangerous weapon in the hands of a few which can affect many.
Despite this supremacy argument, the Court, in discussing conflict of
sovereignties, emphasized the repugnance of a tax on the means em-
ployed by the Union in carrying out its constitutional powers. 43  This
reasoning provided a vehicle for the doctrine of reciprocal intergovern-
mental immunity. Perhaps if the cases which followed McCulloch would
have used the supremacy argument rather than the interference argu-
ment, a one-sided immunity would have developed in favor of the federal
government. The significant cases following McCulloch even had similar
39. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
40. Id. at 320-21.
41. Id. at 429-30 and 436-37; see also Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) particularly at 865-68 where McCulloch is reaffirmed.
42. McCulloch v. Maryland, supra note 39, at 435-36 and at 428-30.
43. McCulloch v. Maryland, supra note 39, at 429-30.
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fact patterns in that they involved a state tax on the federal government.
Weston v. Charleston44 held that a tax on government stock which was
issued for loans made to the federal government was void because:
[t]he tax on government stock is thought by this court to be a tax on the contract, a
tax on the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, and conse-
quently, to be repugnant to the Constitution.45
A nondiscriminatory state tax on offices, trades, professions and occupa-
tions similarly was invalid when applied to an officer of the United
States. 46 As part of their holding, the Court interpreted McCulloch and
Weston as relating that state governments cannot lay a tax upon a con-
stitutional means used by the federal government to carry out its con-
titutional powers. 47
If the doctrine enunciated in McCulloch was truly reciprocal, then
one would expect the Court to hold that a federal tax on state bank
issued notes would also be void. When the Court was confronted with
this situation (a reverse McCulloch fact situation-federal tax on state
bank notes), it took another approach by noting that the bank was not
an agency of the state4 8 and that the bank was simply a corporation
franchised by the state and thus not an instrument of the state in the
performance of a power reserved to the state.49  The decision ren-
dered-if a defeat to reciprocal intergovernmental immunity on a fact
basis-was certainly no defeat to reciprocal intergovernmental immunity
on a conceptual basis. The Court merely decided that the power to reg-
ulate a state national bank was not reserved to the state; it found no fault
with the general proposition that the reserved rights of the state cannot be
subject to congressional taxation. 50  Just exactly what constitutes the
reserved powers of the state is confusing, but the Court, in Collector v.
Day,51 shed some light in its holding that the salary of a state judge
cannot be subject to a federal income tax, since the judiciary constitutes
44. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829).
45. Id. at 469.
46. Dobbins v. The Commissioners of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435
(1842).
47. Id. at 449; See also Thomson v. Pacific R.R., 176 U.S. (9 Wall.) 579 (1869),
which did not dispute the proposition that a state cannot tax the means employed
by the federal government in exercising a constitutional power, but held that a rail-
road company organized under state law and merely doing business with the federal
government was not a means exempt from state taxation.
48. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 535 (1869).
49. Id. at 547-48.
50. Id. at 547-48.
51. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
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an essential governmental function, entitled to tax-exempt status resting
on a necessary implication of self-preservation.52
At no point did the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity become
more reciprocal or stronger than when announced in Collector v. Day.
The Court rejected the federal government's contention that the doc-
trine enunciated in McCulloch was based on the supremacy of the
United States government and, instead, considered the state and federal
governments on an equal basis for purposes of applying the McCulloch
doctrine. 53  With this dual restriction on both federal and state taxation
clearly stated, the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity became es-
tablished as an element of state-federal relations and a vehicle for state-
federal litigation. 54
After Collector v. Day the Court applied the immunity to the interest
received from a railroad company on a mortgage executed by the rail-
road company in favor of the city of Baltimore. 55 This complicated
transaction involved the city of Baltimore issuing five million dollars
worth of bonds to aid in the construction of a railroad.5 6 The railroad
received the proceeds from the issue and executed a mortgage on its
road franchises and revenues. 57  A congressional statute imposed the
tax on the interest payable; but the Court still found it to be a tax on
the holder-creditor (the City of Baltimore), since the law allowed the
railroad to withhold from the creditor the amount paid to the govern-
ment.5 8  The Court had no difficulty in extending intergovernmental
immunity to a municipal corporation, since it was merely a part of a
state and entitled to the same privilege providing the revenue was
municipal in character (within the range of municipal powers). 59 In
determining the transaction to be within the scope of municipal duties,
the Court contrasted a transaction of this nature where the city would
receive a commercial benefit to a situation where a municipal corpora-
52. Id. at 127.
53. Id. at 126.
54. For a federal-state economic relations discussion see K. GEMMILL, FEDERAL-
STATE LOCAL TAX CORRELATION (1953); and for a legal analysis having exhaustive
text and footnote coverage of Supreme Court cases, see Comment, supra note 11.
55. United States v. Railroad Company, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322 (1872).
56. Id. at 329.
57. Id. at 329.
58. Id. at 327. The Court example was that if the interest were 7% and there
were no tax, it would pay the full 7% to the creditor. If, however, there were a
5% tax, it would pay 2% to the creditor and 5% to the government.
59. Id. at 328-29 (for extension to a municipal corporation), 332 (requirement
for municipal revenue), 333 (present transaction within municipal duties).
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tion was merely acting as an agent or trustee of an individual. Thus,
United States v. Railroad Company60 not only affirms reciprocal immunity
in principle but also logically extends immunity to subdivisions of states.
What about intergovernmental immunity among the states? Can one
state tax the public debt of another state, when the chose in action
representing the debt of another state is owned by a resident of the
taxing state? In Bonaparte v. Tax Court,61 the Court answered these
questions in this manner:
It is true, if a State could protect its securities from taxation everywhere, it might
succeed in borrowing money at reduced rates; inasmuch as it cannot secure such ex-
emption outside of its own jurisdiction, it is compelled to go into the market as a
borrower, subject to the same disabilities in this particular as individuals. While the
Constitution of the United States might have been so framed as to afford relief
against such a disability, it has not been, and the States are left free to extend there
comity which is sought, or not, as they please. 62
In not extending the intergovernmental immunity to state-state relations,
this case has probably avoided many problems among taxation ex-
perts, bond market analysts and constitutional lawyers. In addition,
this 1881 observation that the Constitution provides no guarantee of
lower interest rates to states certainly has applicability to a 1972 dis-
cussion of tax-exempt state and local bonds.
To return more specifically to tax-exempt interest from state and local
bonds and their relation to state-federal intergovernmental immunity, it
is hard to determine whether the Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust CO.6a
case is a luxury as a precise case in point or an outdated holding.
Decided in 1895, the Pollock case specifically held that the United States
Government could not tax the income from state and local bonds.64
60. Supra note 55.
61. Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592 (1881).
62. Id. at 595.
63. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
64. Eight years prior to the Pollock decision, in Mercantile Bank v. New York,
121 U.S. 138 (1886) the Court said at 162: "Bonds issued by the State of New
York or under its authority by its public municipal bodies, are means for carrying on
the work of the government, and are not taxable even by the United States, and
it is not a part of the policy of the government which issues them to subject
them to taxation for its own purposes." Pollock, supra note 63, quoted this at
585. To a degree, this is dicta since the facts contained in the Mercantile case
involved the nondiscriminatory taxation of a United States bank which Congress
had consented to be taxed, but required the tax to be no greater than is assessed
on other moneyed capital in the hands of individuals. The statute in question im-
posing the tax, exempted state and local bonds among other things as money capi-
tal. The exemption in dollar amount was almost immaterial, but the Court did say
that they would constitute money capital. However, their exemption was proper
under the previously quoted immunity.
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The Court found the immunity quite reciprocal and relied on the cases
previously mentioned. If Pollock is to be criticized, it must be done on
some other grounds than not following precedent. Once immunity be-
came reciprocal, as in Collector v. Day, no problem in terms of precedent
exists with extending the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity to the
interest on state and local bonds received by the holder of the bonds.
For one thing, Weston v. Charleston, as previously mentioned, deter-
mined that a tax upon U.S. securities was unconstitutional since it would
"operate upon the power to borrow before it is exercised, and have a
sensible influence on the contract,"" 5 thus amounting to a tax on the
contract and a tax on the power to borrow money. In view of the
reciprocal immunity firmly announced in Collector v. Day and United
States v. Railroad Company plus the previous determination that a tax
on government securities was a tax on the borrowing power, precedent-
wise, Pollock's job was easy.
Pollock, in addition to its holding on the income from state or local
bonds, determined that the first federal income tax was invalid with
respect to rent income derived from real estate; and that for the pur-
poses of the Constitution which requires direct taxes to be apportioned,
an income tax, although called indirect, is essentially direct and must
conform with the apportionment rule.66 On the other hand, Weston
determined that a tax on all personal property (in which the statute
specifically includes six and seven percent stock of the United States) 7
was invalid with respect to the United States stock. It can be argued
that the determination in Pollock that an income tax was direct for pur-
poses of the direct tax-apportionment requirement infiltrated Pollock's
reasoning in exempting state and local bonds. If a tax is direct, such as
a real estate tax, then the tax is on the real estate itself. If Pollock
determined that rents from real estate constituted a direct tax on the
real estate and thus a tax on the source, then the taxation of interest
income from state and local bonds is likewise a tax on the source which
ultimately is the state and local bond. To complicate the direct versus
indirect definition of an income tax further, the sixteenth amendment
granted Congress the power to tax incomes from whatever source de-
rived without apportionment. 68  This not only rendered Pollock's
65. Weston v. Charleston, supra note 44, at 468.
66. See Pollock, supra note 63, at 583; aff'd on rehearing 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
67. Weston v. Charleston, supra note 44, at 449.
68. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI: "The Congress shall have power to lay and
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
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reasoning obsolete with respect to the direct nature of an income tax
for the apportionment requirement, but it also raised questions as to
how much additional taxing power was granted to Congress by virtue
of the sixteenth amendment.
In summing up, first, Pollock factually is a case in point and has never
expressly been overruled. Second, Pollock was soundly decided based
on prior precedent, which consists of the initial principle of McCulloch
that a means employed by the United States in carrying out a constitu-
tional power cannot be taxed by the state, and likewise under the prin-
ciple announced in Collector v. Day and the United States v. Railroad
Company, the federal government cannot tax the means employed by a
state government in carrying out its reserved powers. Third, the fact
that Pollock also decided that an income tax as applied to rents and in-
come from real estate was direct for purposes of apportionment may
have influenced an interpretation of intergovernmental immunity with
respect to the interest on state and local bonds. Fourth, since Pollock
was decided prior to the sixteenth amendment and interest from bonds
is income, the effect of the sixteenth amendment must be considered. 69
Although nearly every work on tax-exempt bonds includes a discus-
sion of intergovernmental immunity, it seems that the importance of a
precise case in point is overlooked.70  This is not a criticism but a
question of vogue or style. Since the law has changed quite drastically
in so many areas of federal-state relations, 71 an atmosphere of disrespect
is created for an 1895 case. In this analysis, however, Pollock will be
considered the law unless subsequent case law can indicate a more ap-
propriate constitutional rationale; to determine this, a review of subse-
quent significant decisions on intergovernmental immunity follows.
With respect to the nature of the income tax problem (direct or in-
direct), Flint v. Stone,72 prior to the passage of the sixteenth amend-
ment which allowed Congress to tax gross income, held a federal tax on
various private business organizations for the privilege of doing business
could use net income (including tax-exempt income from state or local
bonds) as a basis for measuring the privilege. 73 A fine distinction can
69. See Justice Black's concurring opinion in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S.
405, 424 (1938).
70. See e.g., Lent, supra note 1; Martori and Bliss, supra note 24, but see
McCollom, supra note 24; Comment, supra note 11; Comment, supra note 10.
71. For a dramatic and well-researched discussion of Supreme Court dilution of
state government powers, see Bums, The Death of E. Pluribus Unum, 19 DEPAUL
LAw REV. 651 (1970).
72. 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
73. Id. at 165. For privilege taxes based on other measuring devices which
768 [Vol. XXI
be made between a pure income tax which directly taxes income from
all sources derived and a privilege tax which uses net income as a
device to measure the amount of business done within that state. To
this extent, Flint lacks relevance to our present income tax structure in
relation to tax-exempt bonds; but what Flint does is remove any
absolutist approach to interest income from state and local bonds. It
distinguishes Pollock as being a direct tax on the property solely be-
cause of ownership 74 and the tax in question as essentially an excise or
privilege tax.
More specifically, tax-exempt bond interest income could be included
in the computation of net income for the basis of a privilege tax. Whether
Flint was proper in distinguishing Pollock so casually as being a direct tax
with respect to the exempt bond issue is questionable in view of the fact
that Pollock made no express statement to that effect and also treated the
exempt bond issue separately in the opinion.75 In any event, the thrust of
Flint did not depend on a direct-indirect view of an income tax but only
on the use of net income as a measuring device for a common privilege
tax.
After the sixteenth amendment was passed, naturally there was litiga-
tion surrounding what powers the amendment did confer on Congress.
In Eisner v. Macomber76 the Court was presented with the problem of
whether a stock dividend can be taxed as income by virtue of the six-
teenth amendment. In response the Court said: "As repeatedly held, this
did not extend the taxing power to new subjects, but merely removed the
necessity which otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the
states of taxes laid on income. ' 77 When the Court was faced with the
reverse facts of Collector v. Day (that being state taxation of the salary
of a federal judge), the Court dismissed any contention that the six-
teenth amendment conflicted with their holding that under article III, sec-
tion 1, establishing the independence of the judiciary, the salaries of
federal judges could not be taxed.78 This Court reiterated the view of
included tax-exempt funds or capital, see Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S.
594 (1890); Society for Savings v. Coite, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 594 (1867).
74. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., supra note 72, at 162.
75. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583-86 (1895) and
compare this to the casual treatment in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., supra note 72,
at 162.
76. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
77. Id. at 206; see also Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918); Stanton v.
Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916); Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S.
1 (1916).
78. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
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Eisner that the sixteenth amendment's purpose only eliminated the need
for apportionment among the states as previously required under Pol-
lock's interpretation of an income tax as being direct.7 9 In view of the
sixteenth amendment and its interpretation, Pollock's interpretation as
to the direct versus indirect nature of an income tax has become irrelevant,
but the amendment did not go beyond this. It merely removed the ob-
stacle created by Pollock which was that for purposes of interpreting the
constitutional requirement that direct taxes must be apportioned, an
income tax is a direct tax.
Although cases dealing with intergovernmental immunity have hap-
hazardly asserted the proposition that a tax on income is a tax on its
source, 80 more recent cases have dispelled this theory. 81  In 1937, an
interesting argument was made before the Supreme Court on the theory
that an income tax is a tax on its source. Appellant, a resident of New
York, brought action for refund of taxes paid on income which was pro-
duced from rents on New Jersey real estate and interest earned on
bonds physically within New Jersey and secured by New Jersey real
estate. 82 The argument was basically that tax on income was in effect
a tax on the source, real estate outside the state, and therefore violated
the fourteenth amendment. 83 In analyzing the argument the Court took
notice of how one government possessed the right to tax property within
its borders, and at the same time another government had the right to
tax the receipt and enjoyment of income from that property. In other
words, the protection offered to one state by virtue of the property being
in that state does not deprive a second state from taxing the receipt or
enjoyment of the income from that property. 84  The Court interpreted
Pollock only to hold that for purposes of determining whether an in-
come tax is direct under article I, section 2, clause 3 which requires appor-
tionment of direct taxes, an income tax on rents or income earned from
property is more direct and was direct in terms of what the Framers
79. See id. at 260-64.
80. See Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216, 227-28 (1931); Northwestern Ins. Co. v.
Wisconsin, 275 U.S. 136, at 141 (1927) (tax in this instance was based on gross
revenues); Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, at 505 (1922); Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co., supra note 72, at 162; Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U.S. 384, 387 (1922).
81. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939); N.Y. ex rel.
Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937); Hale v. Iowa State Board of Assessment and
Review, 302 U.S. 95 (1937).
82. N.Y. ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 311 (1937).
83. Id. at 311.
84. Id. at 314.
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desired this clause to protect.85 Again, the Court was confronted with
whether interest from bonds could be taxed by a general state income
tax when such state bonds were issued pursuant to state statutes pro-
viding unequivocally that they should not be subject to property taxa-
tion.86 The Court found an income tax to be in the nature of a privilege
or excise tax and not within the scope of the exemption, since the
statute only included taxes on property.87 The Court quite clearly stated
that Pollock's holding can only be read in the context of the constitu-
tional clause which it was interpreting and that its holding in no way
requires an interpretation of income taxes to be generally or necessarily
a direct tax on property.88
Thus if Pollock had decided that state and local bonds could not be
subject to the income tax because the income tax was a direct tax on
the source, then it follows its holding could not stand in view of the
present legal holdings that an income tax is not a direct tax on its
source. However, a careful reading of Pollock states otherwise. The sep-
arate opinion on the taxation of income from state or local bonds says
nothing about direct taxes, and in order to make this point clear, the
following extensive quote from Pollock is in order:
The law under consideration provides "that nothing herein contained shall apply
to State, counties or municipalities." It is contended that although the property or
revenues of the States or their instrumentalities cannot be taxed, nevertheless the in-
come derived from state, county, and municipal securities can be taxed. But we
think the same want of power to tax the property or revenues of the States or their
instrumentalities exists in relation to a tax on the income from their securities, and
for the same reason, and that reason is given by Chief Justice Marshall in Weston
v. Charleston 2 Pet. 449, 468, where he said: "The right to tax the contract to any
extent, when made, must operate upon the power to borrow before it is exercised,
and have a sensible influence on the contract. The extent of this influence, depends
on the will of a distinct government. To any extent, however inconsiderable, it is
a burden on the operation of government. It may be carried to an extent which
shall arrest them entirely . . . . The tax on government stock is thought by this
court to be a tax on the contract, a tax on the power to borrow money on the credit
of the United States, and consequently to be repugnant to the Constitution." Apply-
ing this language to these municipal securities, it is obvious that taxation on the in-
terest therefrom would operate on the power to borrow before it is exercised, and
would have a sensible influence on the contract, and that the tax in question is a
tax on the power of the States and their instrumentalities to borrow money, and
consequently repugnant to the Constitution. 89
85. Id. at 315.
86. Hale v. Iowa State Board of Assessment and Review, 302 U.S. 95, 99-100
(1937).
87. See id. at 106-08.
88. Id. at 107.
89. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., supra note 75, at 585-86. Rehear-
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This language represents the critical reasoning behind Pollock's decision;
and other than the brief quote from Weston to the effect that this is a
"tax on the contract," there is no reference to directness as the basis of
the decision. It should be remembered that Weston did involve a prop-
erty tax; therefore, the language "tax on contract" is appropriate for
the facts in Weston. The Pollock Court emphasizes the tax as having
an influence on the power to borrow money before it is exercised.
Thus, the Court does not conclude unconstitutionality on the basis of a
technical direct tax (tax on income = a tax on the source); rather it
decided the case on an impact analysis (the result of the tax is to burden
the state's borrowing power).
The conclusions which follow from the preceding analysis are that:
(1) The sixteenth amendment has not given Congress any additional
powers over the subjects of taxation; and (2) the interpretation that an
income tax was direct for purposes of the apportionment clause did not
infiltrate the Court's reasoning in holding interest income from municipal
bonds exempt from taxation. Subsequent cases which use the direct
nature of an income tax to bolster an infringement of intergovernmental
immunity have not done Pollock justice.90 Fortunately, these cases do
not represent the criteria or standards for judging a violation of inter-
governmental immunity. Thus, the question turns to whether Pollock
can survive the trend in intergovernmental immunity. It is to this ques-
tion that the following analysis addresses itself.
If a state instrumentality or means of carrying out a governmental
function is tax-exempt under the doctrine of intergovernmental immu-
nity, what would happen if a state using the "laboratory" 91 approach-
meaning that federalism as originally formed in the Constitution al-
lowed a state wide discretion in establishing institutions and procedures
for the betterment of its citizens--decides via the citizens of the state
ing of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) took place be-
cause in the first case the Court could not decide on whether the income from per-
sonal property should also be considered direct. Upon rehearing, the Court con-
cluded it was direct for purposes of the constitutional apportionment of direct taxes
requirement. Thus, there was no need for a separate determination of income from
state or local bonds, since these are personal property. Based on this sequence of
events, it is hard to conclude that the original Pollock decision with respect
to municipal bonds was based on notions that an income tax is a direct tax under
all circumstances.
90. See cases cited in note 80 and compare with Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and
Trust Co., supra note 75, at 583-86.
91. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311. Justice Brandeis
wrote: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
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to take outright control of all the business in that state? Would inter-
governmental immunity protect the businesses within that state from
federal taxation? Even a novice in the study of intergovernmental im-
munity could guess that there is no precise case in point. However,
this analogy was made in South Carolina v. United States92 where the
Court held that a federal special tax on a liquor business was not in-
valid against South Carolina when that state conducted the liquor busi-
ness. The exemption for state agencies is limited to those involved in
an operation of a governmental character and not to situations where
the state is carrying on a private business. 93  From this case, it is ap-
parent that some type of a state governmental function must be present
in order to shield the proceeds from the function from taxation under
intergovernmental immunity.
After South Carolina v. United States outlawed tax exemption where
a state operates a liquor business, the Court stated that a limitation,
while at times appearing concrete, is generally difficult to articulate in a
particular fact situation.9 4 Until Helvering v. Gerhardt,95 no particular
standard other than the need for a governmental function was enunciated
by the Court for granting immunity. In some instances the Court simply
stated that an income tax is a tax on its source, and if the particular
source happens to be a federal or state bond, there can be no taxation.96
Other times the Court found a taxing scheme merely to be a device to
tax indirectly what it could not tax directly.9 7 Prior to Helvering v.
92. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905). The particular
analogy to state controlled business is discussed id. at 454-55.
93. Id. at 461. Id. at 461-63, the Court analogized to negligence wherein the
municipality has sovereign immunity when performing public functions, but a mu-
nicipality may also just be a private corporation when acting for private persons.
94. South Carolina v. United States, supra note 92; af'd by Ohio v. Helvering,
292 U.S. 360 (1934). On the same philosophy, the state management of a
street railway business was not immune: Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214
(1934).
95. 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
96. See Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisc., 275 U.S. 136 (1927); Na-
tional Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508 (1928). In Willcuts v. Bunn,
282 U.S. 216 (1931), the Court held a gain from the sale of a tax-exempt bond
could be the subject of an income tax. Instrumental in this holding was the theory
that an income tax on interest amounted to a direct tax on ownership, while an
income tax on the gain resulting from the sale was merely an excise tax on the sale.
97. See Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U.S. 713 (1927). In Missouri ex rel.
Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 313 (1930), the Court did not expressly
find a scheme to directly tax exempt bonds, but held for purposes of a state tax
imposed on the net asset value of insurance companies, the ownership of United
States Bonds cannot be used as a basis for denying a reserve deduction. The
Court found no discrimination with respect to an Internal Revenue Code provision
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Gerhardt, the Court occasionally would not even consider the degree
of burden the tax put upon the government but simply voided the
tax as an interference. 98  Following the strict interpretation of inter-
governmental immunity, salaries of officers of various state and federal
government agencies were receiving tax-exempt status. 99  A familiar
fact pattern involved a gross revenue or income tax imposed on the
lessee of state or federally owned property on income derived from
the lease. 100 After an initial grant of immunity to the lessee, the Court
reversed this position and held the tax on the lessee valid, since its
effect on the government is only indirect and remote. 1 1 Consistent with
this remote theory, the Court held that proceeds from a construction con-
tract with the United States10 2 and copyright and patent royalties' 03 were
subject to state gross receipts taxes.
which disallowed a deduction for interest on loans used to purchase tax-exempt
bonds. Notice, that without this provision, the holder would acquire a double tax
advantage-the exclusion of interest from the bond and the deduction of the interest
on the loan to purchase the bond-Denman v. Slayton, 282 U.S. 514 (1931).
98. Panhandle Oil Company v. State of Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218
(1928); Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931). In Trinity-
farm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U.S. 466 (1934), the Court contended
that once the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity applied, it was an absolute.
However, in the facts of that particular case, the Court held that a contractor who
consumed gasoline in the performance of his contract with the United States was
not an instrumentality of the United States and therefore not immune to an excise
tax based on sales of gasoline. Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936) followed
Panhandle in holding an excise tax based on sales of gasoline void when the sales
were made to the United States Government.
99. See New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937) (General
Counsel for the Panama Railroad Company which had been acquired by Congress
to operate a railroad across the isthmus of Panama); Brush v. Commissioner,
300 U.S. 352 (1937) (The Court found the Bureau of Water Supply of the City
of New York to be an essential governmental function and therefore the salaries
of its officers were exempt from the federal income tax); but see Metcalf & Eddy v.
Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926) (One offering mere professional services per-
formed for a state was not considered an officer or employee of that state);
Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938) (An attorney ap-
pointed by virtue of a state statute for liquidation of a corporation was not an
officer of that state nor was this function of an essential nature.).
100. See Choctaw Oklahoma & Gulf R.R. Co. v. Harrison, 235 U.S. 292 (1914);
Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922); Group No. I Oil Corp. v. Bass,
283 U.S. 279 (1931); Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932);
Burnet v. Jergins Trust, 288 U.S. 508 (1933); Helvering v. Mountain Producers
Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938).
101. Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., supra note 100, which expressly
overruled: Gillespie v. Oklahoma, supra note 100; Burnet v. Coronado Oil and
Gas, supra note 100; and Burnet v. Jergins Trust, supra note 100.
102. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
103. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932).
Helvering v. Gerhardt involved the resistance to the federal income
tax by a construction engineer and two assistant general managers of
the Port of New York Authority which is a bi-state corporation. 04 In
holding their salaries were not immune from taxation, the Court laid
down specific tests for the operation of intergovernmental immunity.
The Gerhardt Court made specific reference to the McCulloch v. Mary-
land distinction between when the federal government taxes the state
and when the state taxes the federal 'government. Thus, a state has a
built in protection via their representatives in Congress as to the degree
of taxation on the states. In view of this political limitation the judicial
limitation will only be imposed when the state function involved is essen-
tial to the maintenance of a state government, 10 5 and the burden imposed
by the tax is substantial or severe. 106 Shortly after this case, Graves v.
New York ex rel. O'Keefe'0 7 applied the same standard to the federal
government when the salary of an examining attorney for The Home Own-
ers' Loan Corporation (a congressionally created corporation) was as-
serted as being exempt from a state income tax. The Court held the
salary taxable under the Gerhardt principles and further hinted that if
Congress desires a different standard with respect to salaries of a con-
gressional instrumentality, Congress should expressly declare this.' 08
Graves expressly overruled Collector v. Day and New York ex rel.
Rogers v. Graves'09 "so far as they recognized an implied constitutional
immunity from income taxation of the salaries of officers or employees
of the national or a state government or their instrumentalities."' 10 Two
years later the Court upheld a sales tax on purchases made by a con-
tractor while performing a contract with the United States."' The mere
fact that the economic burden was shifted did not make it a tax upon
104. For an interesting argument that the Port of New York Authority should
not be considered the type of government agency which can issue tax-exempt
bonds, see Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944) cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945).
105. Helvering v. Gerhardt, supra note 95, at 417-20. For cases decided after
Gerhardt upholding a tax for a lack of showing an essential government func-
tion: see Allen v. Regents of the University of Georgia, 304 U.S. 439 (1938)
(state operated football stadium) and New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572
(1946) (state extraction and sale of mineral waters).
106. Helvering v. Gerhardt, supra note 95, at 417-20.
107. 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
108. id. at 485-87.
109. 299 U.S. 401 (1937).
110. Supra note 107, at 486.
111. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941). This case expressly over-
ruled Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, supra note 98 and Graves v. Texas Co., supra
note 98.
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the United States. With this approach the legal incidence of a sales
tax and not simply the economic incidence must be upon the govern-
ment before immunity is applied. In short, the government must be
liable for the sales tax as the purchaser. " Relatively recent cases have
shown no problem with state taxation for the use of tax-exempt prop-
erty (e.g. federally owned land), 113 but the general rule that lands owned
by the United States are immune from state property taxes is intact." 4
Of particular subject matter interest is United States v. Atlas Life Insur-
ance Co.,' 5 a 1965 case, which held that the owner of tax-exempt bonds
is not constitutionally entitled to pay less tax than those who do not hold
such securities. Note, however, this case has nothing to do with the power
to tax exempt interest from state and local bonds, but only deals with the
allocation of tax-exempt interest to the non-taxable policyholder's reserve
instead of a full deduction for all tax-exempt interest.
Oddly but appropriately enough, the most recent case dealing with
intergovernmental immunity concerns an old-time McCulloch v. Mary-
land-type fact situation (state taxation of national banks). Despite the
dissent's urging for a reevaluation of the doctrine of intergovernmental
immunity, a doctrine which the dissent indicates rests more on the Su-
preme Court's notions of federalism than on any particular constitutional
provision, the Court's majority found a solid legislative history for congres-
sional control of state taxation of national banks. Thus, the majority did
not reach the constitutional question and stated accordingly that any
change in state taxation of national banks must come from Congress.'16
Can Pollock stand the turbulent test of time? First, the major argu-
ment against immunities for interest income from state and local bonds
is that this exemption provides an advantage to private individuals. As
the previous review of recent cases reveal, there is a strong trend
against shielding private individuals by way of tax immunity. Second,
112. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954) recognized this
principle, but found in the contract at issue that the contractors were made pur-
chasing agents of the United States. Thus, the United States Government was the
purchaser.
113. United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958); United States v.
Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958); City of Detroit v. Murray Corp.
of America, 355 U.S. 489 (1958); Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495
(1953).
114. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Rohr Aircraft
Corp. v. San Diego County, 362 U.S. 628 (1960).
115. 381 U.S. 233 (1965). In this case, Atlas Insurance Company argued that
they were entitled to a full deduction for all their tax-exempt interest in spite of
the fact that only a portion of their gross income was subject to the income tax.
116. First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
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no express constitutional provision provides for any tax immunity, let
alone the immunity of interest income on state and local bonds.
On the other hand, if the modern standards of Gerhardt are applied,
the borrowing power of a state is essential to the maintenance of a
state; and the increase in interest costs is a substantial burden on the
state. 117 Further, the power to borrow can be equated with the power
to tax as one of the most essential elements of sovereignty; thus the
power to borrow can be distinguished from the taxable routine operations
of government, such as the payment of salaries to state officials and
contractors purchasing materials to perform contracts with the federal
government. This position stemming from the application of the modem
Gerhardt standards to the same fact pattern as in Pollock sounds re-
markably close to the same rationale used in Pollock's holding. There-
fore, if Pollock is overruled it will not be for lack of precedent prior to
its decision nor for failure to meet the modern standards, but simply
because it is old.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL OBLIGATION
A legal approach to the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental
immunity will often lead one astray from the basic function of state
and local bonds. In a functional sense, state and local bonds represent
debts owed by the state and local governments. State and local govern-
ments enter debt arrangements to raise funds for projects, facilities and
expenses incurred on behalf of their citizens. As with any organization,
funds borrowed represent a supplement to basic revenues which in the
case of government would be revenues from state and local taxes. Thus,
the power to borrow is closely related to the power to finance needed
social projects and services for the state or local government's citizenry.
Certainly, state and local governments have enough needs and ex-
penditures to require financing. 118  The environment, public health,
safety, and welfare and demands for public transportation services name
only a few of the many expenditures which face state and local govern-
ments. To meet these ends, state and local governments have used
their tax revenue, proceeds from tax-exempt bonds and funds received
from federal grants; however, this has not been enough. 119 It can be
117. For a defense of the tax-exempt status based on increased costs and other
problems posed by the complexities of the market place and the intricacies of inter-
governmental finance, see Healy, The Assault on Tax-Exempt Bonds, 36 TAX POLICY
2 (July-August 1969).
118. See e.g. H. REUS, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, REVENUE
SHARING CRUTCH OR CATALYST FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 3-36 (1970).
119. Id. at 36: "In sum, neither the income tax nor additional borrowing
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alleged that a fiscal imbalance exists in American Federalism, since the
national government has control over the most productive revenue-
producing tax (the federal income tax) while the state is confronted
with public service needs most in need of financial support. 1 20  To alle-
viate this strain, several proposals have been made involving federal
aid to states. In a financial sense, these proposals can be categorized
as: (1) bloc or consolidated grants, (2) reduction in national taxes,
(3) increases in national expenditures, (4) tax credits, and (5) federal
revenue sharing. 121 A common denominator of these programs is that
they involve a total budget approach to the problem of channeling more
funds to state and local governments. Although this is a commendable
approach, federal-state fiscal aid and cooperation must also develop on
a program-by-program basis and also on more mundane levels. 122  At
this level, state and local bonds, consistent with the spirit of revenue
sharing, grants-in-aid, and other proposals, have assumed a new role
in the area of intergovernmental financial relations.
During 1970, three congressional acts involving federal loan programs
used state and local bond financing in an imaginative fashion. 128  These
loan programs provide in essence that the federal government can make
a loan to the state or local government. The state issues a bond to
evidence this debt, and the interest rate which they pay on the bond or
debt to the federal government is the tax-exempt rate. When the fed-
eral government sells the bond to a private investor, the acts provide
offers any real hope of solving the financial crisis of local government which
faces the future with huge demands on its purse and no immediately obvious way of
increasing revenues." See also W. HELLER, REVENUE SHARING AND THE CrrY 10-14
(1968).
120. R. WAGNER, THE FISCAL ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 21-22
(1971); Benson, Revenue Sharing: An Analysis of Alternative Statutory Approaches,
8 HARV. J. LEGIs. 221 (1971). These authors do not necessarily vouch for the
soundness of this position, but merely describe the alleged fiscal imbalance. For a
direct support of the fiscal imbalance argument, see Brazer, Federal Government
and State-Local Finances, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 155 (1967); but see Musgrave and
Polinsky, Revenue Sharing: A Critical View, 8 HARV. J. LEGIS. 197 (1971) con-
cluding in part that the real problem is both a scarcity of federal funds as well as
state funds.
121. R. WAGNER, supra note 120, at 24.
122. Compare general description of types of programs in text at note 121 with
Turner, Federal-State Cooperation in Tax Administration, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV.
958 (1968).
123. Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Amendments, PuB. L.
No. 91-296, 84 STAT. 336; Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, PuB. L.
No. 91-609, 84 STAT. 1769; Agricultural Credit Fund-Loans-Income Tax-
Interest, Pun. L. No. 91-617, 84 STAT. 1855.
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for no tax-exempt privilege.124  It is as if the federal government issued
a new bond which was not tax-exempt. As a result, the private investor
will demand and receive a higher interest rate; and the difference be-
tween the two interest rates (rate received by investor-rate paid by
local government) is paid by the federal government. In short, the fed-
eral government subsidizes the difference between the taxable interest
rate and the tax-exempt interest rate.
These loan programs are in response to a four prong situation: (1)
State and local governments have tremendous financial needs;' 2 5 (2)
the state and local bond is an important financial device for these gov-
ernments; 126 (3) the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity protects
the interest from state and local bonds from federal income taxation;
127
and (4) the loss of revenues to the federal government because the tax-
exempt feature on a federal-state fiscal relationship basis makes fi-
nancing solely by state and local bonds somewhat inefficient.' 28  For
example, Congress was faced with the critical needs of both public and
private hospitals for hospital and medical care construction and modern-
ization of facilities. 129  Originally, the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce of the House realized the importance of the state
and local bonds as a means of financing these medical needs and con-
sidered these needs of such magnitude that the federal government
should make guaranteed loans to state and local governments without
124. Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Amendments, PUB. L.
No. 91-296 Title II § 627 (e); Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, PUB.
L. No. 91-609, Title VII, § 713 (a) Agricultural Credit Fund-Loans-Income Tax
-Interest, PUB. L. No. 91-617, 84 STAT. 1855.
125. See text and footnotes at notes 118-19.
126. See e.g. Lewis, The Case for the Urban Development Bank in Financing
State and Local Governments in the 70's, proceedings of a conference sponsored by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston at Nantucket Island (1970), particularly at
179, Table II (Source: The Bond Buyer, 1970) which indicates in 1968-a 16.4
billion dollar gross long-term issue increase by way of municipal bonds and in
1969, an 11.4 billion dollar long-term issue increase. See also 116 CONG. REC.
S5239 (daily ed. April 7, 1970) which contains Table XI Supply and Demand for
State and Local Securities (prepared by Solomon Brothers & Hulzer from their
1969, Annual Review of the Bond Market) which indicates similar figures for gross
new long term issues of 16.1 billion dollars for 1968 and 11.5 billion dollars for 1969.
127. See text discussion of intergovernmental immunity.
128. See D. Ott and A. Meltzer supra note 18.
129. See generally Hearings on H.R. 6797, 7059, and 3783 on Hospital and
Health Facility Construction and Modernization before the Subcommittee on Public
Health and Welfare of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); Hearings on S 2182 and H.R. 11102 on Medical Care
Facilities Construction and Modernization before the Subcommittee on Health of
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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any taxable feature.180 With this approach, a new type of bond would
hit the market place-a state or local bond not only with the tax-exempt
interest feature provided by intergovernmental immunity but also a bond
backed by the credit of the United States. Among other things this
type of security could have a sensitive influence on the state and local
bond market, since these bonds would be most attractive to investors.131
In addition, the Treasury Department opposed this type of financing.
For one thing, the bond interest tax exemption is an inefficient form of
subsidy, since the federal tax revenue lost by the tax-exempt feature
exceeds the interest savings to the borrower. 182  Faced with this situa-
tion, Congress eventually developed the loan program as previously de-
scribed, wherein the interest income from the federally guaranteed state
or local bond becomes taxable when sold to a private investor.
Once again the state and local need for resources to develop new
communities 13 and in local rural areas to develop adequate water and
waste facilities13 4 activated the use of the federally guaranteed taxable
state and local obligation. Without belaboring the point, the transaction
which takes place in one of these congressional loan programs is initially
that the federal government makes a loan to the state or local govern-
ment. They, in turn issue an evidence of indebtedness (a bond) to
the federal government which the federal government guarantees; fur-
ther, the loan programs provide that the interest from the federally
guaranteed state or local obligation becomes taxable when subsequently
sold by the federal government to an investor. This is not a precedent
for taxing state and local securities, since the transaction between the
federal government and the private purchaser can be viewed simply as
a separate contract whereby the private purchaser agrees to report the
interest for federal income tax purposes. Also, technically the interest
is actually paid by the federal government after a sale to a private in-
vestor and not by the state or local government, even though the state
or local government pays to the federal government the interest on the
original loan at the original tax-exempt rate.'8 5 A more transaction-
oriented approach is to say that the federal guarantee has created "a new
130. See H.R. REP. No. 91-262, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 7-8 (1969).
131. See S. REP. No. 91-657 91st Cong. 2nd Sess. 58-59 (Individual Views of
Mr. Dominick) (1970).
132. 116 CONG. REC. S5239 (daily ed. April 7, 1970) (Formal statement by the
treasury department pt. (4) ).
133. See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, PuB. L. No. 91-609,
Title VII § 710.
134. 116 CONG. REC. 1058 (daily ed. April 7, 1970) (remarks of Representative
Byrnes).
135. S. REP. No. 91-1469, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 3 (1970).
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type of obligation."' 3 6 By having the federal guarantee on the instru-
ment, the note is in the nature of a federal obligation which is not tax-
exempt. 137 Thus, in a compromising sense, the obligation can be de-
scribed as an intergovernmental obligation, since it is state-oriented in
origin and purpose, but federal by way of subsequent sale and guarantee.
In any event, a description as an intergovernmental obligation is con-
sistent with the spirit of cooperation in intergovernmental fiscal relations.
Relatively recent bills in Congress have evidenced a development on
both a program-by-program basis and, on a larger scale, by means of a
national bank designed to guarantee and deal with these federal loans
to state and local governments. On a program basis, one bill provides
for an Environmental Financing Authority which would purchase any
obligation issued by a state or local public body which was issued to
finance that government's share of a construction project in which the
Secretary of Interior is authorized to provide grants. 138  This bill would
function similar to the guaranteed taxable bond approach, since the
agency would issue a federal taxable bond of its own at a higher interest
rate to finance the purchase of the state and local bonds-the difference
in interest rates being subsidized by the Treasury. 139
House bill 9688 in one section implements the federal guaranteed
taxable approach to finance state and local activities consistent with the
purposes of housing and urban development, 140 but also proposes an
Urban Development Bank which would make long term develop-
ment loans and provide technical assistance to state and local govern-
ments for the construction of essential public works and community
facilities. 14  Similarly, Senate bill 580 would establish a National Devel-
opment Bank which would make or guarantee long term loans at rea-
sonable interest rates to state and local governments for the construction
of public works and facilities. 142  An interesting, although not particu-
136. 116 CONG. REC. H 6344 (daily ed. July 6, 1970) (remarks of Representa-
tive Byrnes).
137. Id. at H 6345.
138. H.R. 2151, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. § 5 (1971).
139. See H.R. 2151, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. § 8 (1971). For a recent bill using a
contrary approach, maintaining the tax-exempt status of the state or local
agency in spite of being secured by a pledge of a loan by the federal government,
see H.R. 9331, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. Title II-Public Housing Assistance Program
§ 12 (1971).
140. H.R. 9688, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 703(a) (1971).
141. H.R. 9688, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 801 (1971).
142. S. 580, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1971); see also H.R. 1521, H.R. 3550,
S. 1958, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) which also were proposed to establish na-
tional development or domestic development banks.
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larly relevant, aspect of this bill is that the Bank could make loans to
individuals or corporations to establish or expand a business. With
respect to the concept of an intergovernmental obligation, both bills pro-
vide that any and all of the bank's obligations shall be subject to federal,
state, and local taxation.143  With the taxable feature, the bank merely
performs on a more general banking scale what the loan programs en-
acted in 1970 accomplished individually. For example, the bank would
make a loan to a state at a tax-exempt rate, 144 indirectly if not directly
the loan to the state would be financed by the bank's own obligations
which are taxable; thus, the bank would end up subsidizing the differ-
ence between the tax-exempt rate and the taxable rate.
In an economic federal-state fiscal relationship, the National Devel-
opment Bank appears productive. It will expand the state and local
bond market, since the present market only appeals to individuals and
institutions (such as commercial banks) in the high tax bracket. 145  For
example, a 50% bracket taxpayer finds a 6% municipal bond very lu-
crative, since this would be the equivalent of a 12% private taxable
bond. However, a taxpayer in the 25% bracket would find a 6%
municipal the equivalent to a 8% private (8% - .25 (8%) = 6% ). In
addition to this rather straightforward mathematical test, it must be kept
in mind that investors seeking tax advantages from investment in state
and local bonds will also consider other tax shelters, such as capital
gain, depreciation and depletion allowances. 146  Thus, the state and
local bond competes with other tax shelters as well as private bonds.
In this context, the state and local bond is not receiving its economic
due in the market place, especially when the post-war default record of
state and local bonds is second only to the United States Government. 147
These observations may not offer an overwhelming argument for the
establishment of a National Development Bank;148 but at the same time
143. H.R. 9688, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 811 (1971); S. 580, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 22 (1971).
144. Theoretically, this would have to be true, since if the bank rate were
higher than the regular market interest rate for state and local bonds, then the
state or local government would simply not borrow from the bank. However,
this is somewhat of an oversimplification because some small local governments
have little credit reputation and in spite of their tax-exempt feature have trouble
borrowing. In addition, the increasing use of what amounts to a taxable state or
local bond will have its effect on state and local tax-exempt interest rates.
145. See 116 CONG. REC. S9661 (daily ed. June 22, 1971) (article by L.R.
Gabler, a senior analyst with the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions summarizing that commissions findings); Lewis, supra note 126, at 165.
146. 116 CONG. REC. supra note 145.
147. Lewis, supra note 126, at 168.
148. For an article which criticizes a large scale approach such as the Develop-
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they offer enough support to commend the initial concept as an imagi-
native approach to federal-state relations. Particularly commendable is
the way a program such as this, like the guaranteed taxable state and
local bond (intergovernmental obligation), preserves the sound constitu-
tional concept of intergovernmental immunity and at the same time
removes some of the economic inefficiencies created by the use of tax-
exempt bonds to finance programs for social needs.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental immunity and the
use of federally guaranteed state and local debt as an intergovernmental
obligation both stem from concepts of federalism. Intergovernmental
immunity was implied from principles of self-preservation essential to
the existence of dual sovereigns. In using the intergovernmental obli-
gation approach to finance needed social projects, an economic, federal-
state or fiscal federalism is being employed.
For imaginative forms of fiscal federalism, such as the intergovern-
mental loan obligation or the National Development Bank to work,
there must be some assurance that intergovernmental immunity devel-
oped from a constitutional federalism will continue to shield the interest
income from federal taxation. Since Congress has already created loan
programs which utilize the federally guaranteed state and local obliga-
tion (intergovernmental obligation), it is doubtful that they will wage
another campaign against the tax exemption afforded to the bonds.
However, as this paper previously pointed out with respect to the inter-
governmental immunity issue: Do not underestimate the Supreme
Court's assurance of tax-exempt state and local bonds contained in
Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust, just because it is of 1895 vintage.
Frank Foster
ment Bank and further develops the financial problems facing both the public and
private sector around the lack of savings, see Wallich, Discussion, Financing State
and Local Governments, proceedings of a conference sponsored by the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Boston at Nantucket Island (1970). For sophisticated pro and
con economic discussions of the guaranteed state or local bond or a national de-
velopment bank approach, see Surrey, Federal Income Taxation of State and
Local Government Obligations, 36 TAX POLICY 3 (1969); Healy, supra note 117;
Huefner, Municipal Bonds: The Cost and Benefits of an Alternative, 23 NAT'L
TAX J. 407 (1970); Ackerman & Ott, Analysis of the Revenue Effects of Proposed
Substitute for Tax Exemption of State and Local Bonds, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 397
(1970). Apparently, the economic arguments against an Urban Development Bank
or National Development Bank have been persuasive with Congress, since there
has been no legislation passed. For the economic rationale before Congress against
these development banks, see Hearings on H.R. 9688 Before the Subcomm. on
Housing of the Committee on Banking and Currency House of Representatives, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 780-838 (1971).
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